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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-PRIVILBGE AGAINST SELF-lNCRIMINATION-WAIVER

UNDER CoMPULSORY TESTIMONY ACT-Smith, sole owner and officer of a clothing
corporation, appeared before an OPA examiner in response to a subpoena to produce the corporate books. Under the Emergency Price Control Act1 these records
were required to be kept and preserved. Smith said that the records were
"destroyed, lost, or misplaced.'' Then, on claiming privilege against self-incrimination, he testified as to activities of the corporation and contents of the absent
records. During the interrogation Smith made a long statement in partial summation of his testimony. When he finished, he was asked, ''This is a voluntary

1

56 Stat. L. 23, §202(b) (1942); 50 U.S.C. (1944) §922.
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statement. You do not claim immunity with respect to that statement'?" He
answered, "No." Smith was later convicted of conspiracy to violate the EPCA
by intentionally misusing priority ratings. On appeal, there was a partial reversal on the ground that under the Compulsory Testimony Act2 Smith had
obtained immunity from prosecution to that portion of his testimony to which
he had claimed his privilege, but not to that portion to which there was an express
waiver.3 On certiorari, held, reversed. It was not shown whether the "no" applied
to the examiner's first or second statement, and no effort was made to clarify
its meaning. In view of the specific claim of privilege, the equivocal "no" did not
constitute a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore, by
his testimony, Smith gained full immunity from prosecution. Smith 11. United
States, 337 U.S. 137, 69 S.Ct. 1000 (1949).
Constitutional provisions against self-incrimination regardless of the wording4 are construed to give the privilege to an individual of not incriminating
himself5 in his own trial or any future trial6 by oral testimony or forced production of records.7 However, in opposition to this protection of the individual is
the necessity of having witnesses in order to get at the facts in a case. By judicial
construction this privilege does not apply to corporations8 or to those records that
are required by law to be kept.9 Also, as governmental regulative functions
2 56 Stat. L. 23, §202(g) (1942): "No person shall be excused from complying with
any requirements under this section because of his privilege against self-incrimination, but
the immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of ••• 1893 ••• shall apply with
respect to any individual who specifically claims such privilege." Compulsory Testimony
Act of 1893, 27 Stat. L. 443, c. 83, 49 U.S.C. (1937) §46: "No person shall be excused
from ••• testifying or from producing books •••• But no person shall be prosecuted ••• on
account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which be may testify or produce
evidence ••• before said commission or in obedience to its subpoena ••••"
s United States v. Daisart (C.C.A. 2d, 1948) 169 F (2d) 856 at 861.
4 U.S. Const., Amendment V: ''No person ••• shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ••••" This provision does not apply to the states. Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908).
Ii Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1885) extends this privilege to
quasi-criminal proceedings as well.
6 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195 (1892); 8 W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE, §2252 at p. 324 (1940); Corwin, "The Supreme Court's Construction of the SelfIncrimination Clause," 29 IVhcH. L. REv. 1 (1930).
7 See footnote 5, supra. State v. Davis, 108 Mo. 666, 18 S.W. 894 (1892); Holt v.
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2 (1910); 8 W1cMORE, EVIDENCE §2264 (1940).
Contra: Smith v. State, 247 Ala. 354, 24 S. (2d) 546 (1946). See 97 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
441 (1949) for a list of cases on which types of testimony are covered by this privilege.
For the history and present policy considerations of the privilege, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§2250, 2251 (1940); 49 YALE L. J. 1059 (1940).
8 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538 (1911); Essgee Co. of China
v. United States,"262 U.S. -151, 43 S.Ct. 514 (1923). The custodian of corporate records
cannot refuse to produce them although they will incriminate him as well. Okla. Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494 (1946).
9 Dicta in Wilson v. United States, supra, note 8, led to Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375 (1947). See also 8 WmMoRB, EVIDENCE, §2259(c) (1940). The
privilege extends to aliens. United States v. Brooks (D.C. Mich. 1922) 284 F. 908.
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increase there is a great need for some complete limitation to compel testimony
in order to facilitate the enforcement of these regulations.10 Thus, by statute,
the privilege to refuse to answer a question is destroyed by giving immunity
from prosecution11 in return for the normally privileged testimony.12 This
privilege must be claimed or it is held to be waived.13 Then it is also limited by
the holding that these federal immunity statutes need protect witnesses from
federal prosecution only.14 A tendency to limit this privilege even further was
indicated when a federal district court decided that oral testimony on self-incriminating matters disclosed in absent unprivileged records should not be
privileged.15 This holding was advanced in the principal case, but the court
of appeals refused to go this far.16 It was not discussed on certiorari. Finally, on
the question of waiver, this decision shows the tendency to demand a clearer
showing of waiver than the lower courts have sometimes required in the past.17
'Waiver of constitutional rights is not lightly to be inferred. A witness cannot
properly be held after claim to have waived his privilege and consequent immunity on vague and uncertain evidence."18 It is submitted this is the proper,
practical view, for often these interrogations are long confusing affairs during
which an unwary businessman might otherwise lose his privilege before a skillful
examiner. If the privilege is desirable, its existence should not be so precarious.

John A. Nordberg

1041 YA.LI! L. J. 618 (1932); 49 YALE L. J. 1059 at 1075 (1940); 8 WIGMOBB,
§2281 (1940). This also contains a complete list of federal and state statutes
granting immunity.
11 This is where the immunity is as broad as the privilege. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1895); State v. Ruff, 176 Minn. 308, 223 N.W. 144 (1929); 8
WIGMOBB, EVIDENCE §2283 (1940).
12 See footnote 11, supra. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375 (1947);
United States v. Weisman (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 260; 8 WxGMOBB, EVIDENCE
§§2281, 2282 (1940).
1a 56 Stat. L. 23 §202(g); Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 266 (1869).
14 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63 (1931). A similar rule
has been adopted by most states. Republic of Greece v. Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318, 162
N.E. 345 (1928). For further authority see 45 HARV. L. REv. 595 (1932). For a slight
restriction on this rule, see People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W. (2d) 284 (1947).
15 Porter v. Heend (D.C. ill. 1947) 6 F.R.D. 588. " ••• defendant cannot by maintaining defective records, require the plaintiff to exchange immunity froin prosecution for
the balance of information to which the plaintiff is entitled." Fleming v. Silverman, (D.C.
ill. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 29 at 31.
16 United States v. Daisart Sportswear, supra, note 3.
11 United States v. DeLorenzo (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 122.
1s Principal case at 150.
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